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RECENT DECISIONS

LABOR LAw AUTHORIZED

TO

FEDERAL JURISDICTION ENJOIN

STRIKES

IN

FEDERAL COURTS NOT

VIOLATION

BARGAINING AGREEMENTS DESPITE SECTION

OF

COLLECTIVE

301 OF TAFT - HART-

LEY ACT.- Sinclair Refining Company and Local 7-210 of the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union entered into a collective
bargaining agreement containing a no-stike clause and providing
for compulsory arbitration of grievances. Following a breach of
the no-strike clause, Sinclair relied on Section 301 of the TaftHartley Act' and requested an injunction from the federal district
court. The union's motion to dismiss was granted and the Court
of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the petitioner argued that since
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act granted federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear suits for labor contract violations, the
district court was thereby empowered to enjoin the respondent
union from striking. In affirming the Supreme Court held that
the prohibition against enjoining strikes contained in Section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 was not impliedly repealed by
section 301. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
In 1932, Congress, to overcome the anti-union attitude of the
courts which had developed in the early years of union-employer
conflicts, enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and specifically prohibited the enjoining of peaceful strikes by federal courts.3 The
1"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization . .. or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
2 "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singularly
or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment . . . (i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or
inducing without fraud or violence the acts heretofore specified. .. .
47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
3 Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mica. L. REv.
673, 676 (1961); see Feinsinger, Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A
New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1263 (1957);
Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 354, 355-56 (1958).
This trend also evidenced itself in the states. For instance, New York
enacted Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act which limits the state
courts' injunctive powers in labor disputes. However, this statute does not
offer to the unions as much protection as a literal reading of the legislation implies.

The statute states:

"No court nor any judge . . . shall

have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute
except after findings of all the following facts. .

.

. (f) That no item

of relief granted prohibits directly or indirectly any person . . . from

doing . . . any of the following acts: (1) Ceasing or refusing to perform
any work or to remain in any relation of employment. . . ." New York
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unions thereafter gradually became a major force on the American
labor scene and striking, in violation of contractual commitments,
became a prevalent practice. Because of this, the congressional
policy of union protection was reversed. 4 With the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, the federal courts were given the
power to settle contract disputes between employers and unions
irrespective of the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
parties. The national labor policy became one of fostering collective bargaining. 5 The development of no-strike and arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements as a substitute for
industrial strife has manifested itself in the American labor field
during the past twenty years.6
Although the more recent enactment of Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act gives the federal courts jurisdiction of suits
between union and management involving the breach of collective
bargaining agreements, Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which prohibits the enjoining of peaceful labor strikes, was never
repealed by Congress.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,7 the union
brought suit under section 301 to compel the employer to arbitrate
a grievance. The contention that this section was a mere procedural device to give federal courts jurisdiction in labor controversies rather than a source of substantive law was not accepted
by the Court.8 Rather, the majority found this section as authorizing the courts to fashion a body of federal substantive law for the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does
more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations.
It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be best obtained only in that way. 9

courts have held, however, that the state legislature had no intention of
depriving the courts of the power to enjoin a breach of any employerunion contract. Thus the courts have enjoined unions from calling or
continuing a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
Greater City Master Plumbers Ass'n, Inc. v. Kahme, 6 N.Y.S.2d 589, (Sup.
Ct. 1937). See J. I. Hass Co. v. McNamara, 21 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
4 Hoebreckx, Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 417,
435 (1960).
5 Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 635,
645 (1959); Feinsinger, supra note 3, at 1268.
ORice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 233,
252 (1951).
7353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8 See Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REV. 1247 (1957).
9 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
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The Court then faced the problem of the prohibitive nature
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 8 of the act prohibits the
issuance of injunctions where the party has failed to make every
effort to settle the dispute through mediation, negotiation or
arbitration. The Court took cognizance of the philosophy of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act-that management and labor should be left
to negotiation backed only by self-help and economic weapons.',
In light of this attitude, section 8 might have been interpreted to
prohibit the Court from giving the mandatory injunction requested.
However, the Court granted relief to the union and commented that
"the congressional policy in favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes being clear, there is no
reason to submit them to the requirements of . . . the NorrisLaGuardia Act." 11 The arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement was specifically enforced.
Thus, legislation which was enacted to temper union activity
was successfully used by the unions themselves to compel management to meet its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.' 2 Whether management could be as successful in obtaining
injunctive relief for enforcing the quid pro quo of the arbitration
clause, i. e., the no-strike clause, was still undecided.
In 1957 an employer specifically sought such injunctive relief.13
Although the district court granted the relief desired, on appeal
the decision was reversed. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found no authority in Lincoln Mills for enjoining a strike.
Although the Supreme Court had held that the order compelling
arbitration was not prohibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, in
the court's opinion this did not authorize a finding that section
301 would enable a court to enjoin strikes where the application
of this remedy was specifically prohibited by statute. Since section 4 specifies strikes as one of the union activities exempted
from the federal injunctive powers, the redress requested by the
employer was refused.
A similar dispute arose in the Tenth Circuit and that court
was also faced with the problem of reconciling the jurisdictional
grant of Taft-Hartley, with
the drastic prohibition of injunctive
14
relief in Norris-LaGuardia.

10 See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 H.Av. L.
Rxv. 591, 602-03 (1954).
11 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 9, at 458-59.
12 Feinsinger, supra note 3, at 1272.
'3 A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 155 F. Supp. 739
(E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932
(1958).
14 Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d

345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd, 370 U.S. 711 (1962)

(per curiam).
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The Tenth Circuit felt that the Norris-LaGuardia Act had
to be read in light of the later enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act so that the purpose of each act might be preserved. The
court, in granting the relief refused by the Second Circuit,
concluded that
[I]f the courts are to exercise jurisdiction for the redress of violations
of collective bargaining agreements . . . they are empowered to vouchsafe

the integrity of a bargaining contract to the end that neither party shall be
deprived of the fruits of their bargain .

. .

. And this is so . . . whether

the claimed violation is a refusal to arbitrate according to the terms of
the contract [the Li.coh; Mills situation], or the violatiot of an agreement
15
not to strike ....
The Supreme Court in the instant case considered the above
argument but found, in harmony with the Second Circuit, that
section 301 was not intended to repeal Section 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Viewing the history and language of the TaftHartley Act and finding no basis for granting the relief requested
by the petitioner, the Court then turned to the Lincoln Mills
decision.

[T]he equitable relief granted in that case- a mandatory injunction
to carry out an agreement to arbitrate -did not enjoin any one of the
kinds of conduct which the specific prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act withdrew from the injunctive powers of the United States courts. An
injunction against work stoppages . . . however, prohibits the precise kinds
of conduct which

. . . the Norris-LaGuardia

cannot be prohibited. 16

Act unequivocally

say[s]

The majority intimated that although a change in this area
might be beneficial, the feasibility of such action "is a question
for law-makers, not law-interpreters." 17
The dissent argued that the circumstance which motivated
the Norris-LaGuardia Act - "the at-largeness of federal judges
in enjoining activities thought to seek 'unlawful ends' or to
constitute 'unlawful means' "-was not present in the case at hand.' 8
The purpose of section 301, i. e., to assist in collective bargaining,
was thought reason enough to hold the union to their express
contractual commitment to refrain from striking.
However, the dissent did not agree with petitioner that section
301 repeals section 4 but rather, argued that these two statutes
were intended to coexist. When the Norris-LaGuardia Act stands
in the way of an important objective of the Taft-Hartley Act,
the former should not bar granting the relief requested.

15 Id. at 349. (Emphasis added.)
16 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 212 (1962).
7
' Id. at 215.
181d. at 219 (dissenting opinion).
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Regarding policy considerations, three basic points might be
advanced in support of the conclusion reached by the majority:
(1) The most fundamental argument is that a no-strike
clause is not the specific quid pro quo for an arbitration clause and,
therefore, while the arbitration clause will be enforced, this in itself
offers no logical reason for enjoining a strike. It is contended
that since a no-strike clause is the only important promise that a
union makes to an employer, all promises running from employer
to employee comprise the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause.' 9
It is further claimed that to equate grievance procedures with a
pledge not to strike is unsound since it leads to the assumption
that a union will necessarily strike for every grievance issue 20
However, it may be argued that since multitudinous strikes are
exactly what the employer tries to avoid by a no-strike clause,
and since the union demands a safeguard or a proper grievance
procedure before it will surrender this right, each clause does
appear to be the quid pro quo for the other.
(2) It may be claimed that to enjoin strikes would make
unions hesitate to enter into collective bargaining agreements containing no-strike provisions. However, on the state level, in
four states where legislation permitting such injunctions has been
enacted, no such trend has been observed. 21
(3) An obvious reason for not enjoining strikes, through
section 301, is that to do so is to concede the repeal of Section 4
The prohibitive language of
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
section 4 is plain. 22 This policy was adopted in the instant case.
The Court pointed out the function of the court is to adjudicate;
the work of remedial legislation is the prerogative of Congress.
The question remains, is there a need for such legislation?
The employer still possesses two basic remedies which are left intact
by the instant case: a termination of the collective 2 bargaining
4
3
agreement 2 and a suit for damages against the union.

Although it is true that management may terminate the agreement when violated by a union strike, this is a poor remedy
indeed. The union usually strikes because it is unsatisfied with

19 Stewart, No Strike Clauses it; the Federal Courts, 59 MIc. L. REv.
673, 686 (1961).
20 See Stewart, supra note 19, at 687.
21 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 n.4 (1957);
Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. Rlv. 233, 234-35
(1951).
22
Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 354, 371 (1958).
23 Hoebreckx, Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 417,
437 (1960).
24

Id. at 433.
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the present agreement.2 5 By terminating, the employer places
himself in a position where he must negotiate a new collective
bargaining agreement if
the union still represents a majority of
2 6
the employer's workers.

The more effective economic weapon retained by the employer
is the suit for damages. However, a money judgment is also a
poor substitute for performance 27 since it does not compensate for
actual loss suffered by the employer. A strike often involves the
loss of future business, and such an injury which is occasioned
long after the strike is settled, is so speculative 28in nature that
courts are necessarily reluctant to award damages.
The monetary award, although not completely compensating
the employer, may, however, prove an effective weapon. A substantial judgment may cripple even the abundant treasury of a
large national union, and where the union is local only, even an
29
unsubstantial award may prove a valuable bargaining weapon.
It should also be noted that although the employer is powerless
to enjoin a strike, the Lincoln Mills doctrine suggests he has the
power to force the union to arbitrate where the agreement so
provides. 80 Even with these economic weapons, however, the
employer is still not completely equal to the union. The union
may obtain specific performance of the arbitration clause, while
the quid pro quo, the no-strike clause, remains safe from federal
injunction.
As of 1960 few employers attempted to avail themselves of
injunctive relief in reliance on section 301. 31 Now that it is finally
determined that such relief is unattainable, employers suffer no
unexpected loss. Therefore, this inequality should have little effect
upon future collective bargaining.3 " If, however, the future shows
that the imbalance is seriously hindering peaceful labor relations,
25
2

Id. at 437.

6 Ibid.

27 Rice, supra note 21, at 253.
28

29

Hoebreckx, supra note 23, at 433.

Ibid.

30 Note, supra note 22, at 365.
31
32

Hoebreckx, supra note 23, at 419.

The instant case raises some problems in the state injunctive area. Many
states have enacted "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts." See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT §876-a. Whether state courts can continue to interpret these
statutes as permitting the enjoining of union strikes remains to be seen. See
Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 354, 366-68 (1958). Assuming the states are not
specifically prohibited from granting this equitable relief, they may on policy
grounds follow the principles enunciated in the present case. If the future
shows that the states are not obligated to follow the case at hand, and they
refuse to do so voluntarily, the National Labor Relations Board may take
jurisdiction over cases which previously in their discretion they have refused,
in order to prohibit parties from circumventing the instant decision by choosing
a state forum.
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is the proper forum in which to remedy the
then Congress
33
problem.

M
TAXATION - MEDICAL EXPENSES - LIMITED DEDUCTION FOR
CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT ALLOWED. -Appellant
suffered from a

heart condition that rendered him incapable of climbing the steep
hillside that connected the street and lower level of his residential
property. In order to enjoy the normal use of his property and to
avoid further damage to his heart, the appellant erected a
Hil-A-Vator, designed to carry him up and down the incline.
He unsuccessfully sought to deduct the entire cost of the device
as a medical care expenditure in the district court. In reversing
the judgment of that court in favor of the Commissioner, the
Circuit Court for the Ninth Circuit held that the expense involved
in the purchase and installation of the Hil-A-Vator was a medical
care expenditure, and, to the extent that the cost of the device
exceeded the increase in value of the property, it was deductible.
Riach v. Frank, 302 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962).
Both the 1939 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes contain
substantially similar provisions for the deduction from gross income
of certain medical expenses.1 Both Codes likewise contain very
33 Certain sections of the Taft-Hartley Act do expressly repeal sections
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For example, § 301 (e) (61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1958)) repeals § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It
would appear that if Congress had also intended to repeal § 4 this also would
have been done expressly.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x), added by ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 24(a) (1), 53 Stat.
16 (1939), as amended, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat 826 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as 1939 Code]: "Deductions from gross income. In computing net income
there shall be allowed as deductions: .... (x) Medical, dental, etc., expenses.
Expenses paid during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance
or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent
..
(2) . . . . The term 'medical care,' as used in this subsection, shall
include amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body (including amounts paid for accident or health insurance)."
INr. REv. CoDE: OF 1954, § 213 [hereinafter cited as 1954 CoD] :
"Medical, dental, etc., expenses.
(a) Allowance of deductions. - There
shall be allowed as a deduction the following amounts of the expenses paid
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise,
for medical care of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent. . .
(e) Definitions-For purposes of this section(1) The term 'medical care' means amounts paid(A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of

